There is a large and persistent gap at the post-baccalaureate level in the quality of programs from which men and women earn their degrees. I describe the relationship and tradeoff between gender and ability among applicants across quality. There are substantial gender differences in the test scores and ability of male and female applicants, particularly in the natural sciences. Guided by a simple model of admissions, I estimate an educational production function that recovers the value of a student body's gender mix in terms of average student ability and program quality. Programs in the natural and social sciences face a substantial tradeoff between the student body gender mix and output quality. Programs in professional degree fields experience no significant loss in educational quality when they adjust the gender composition of their student body.
Introduction
Post-baccalaureate (PB) education in the U.S. is highly stratified by quality. In most fields, highly-ranked programs are very selective, and draw in many of the highestability undergraduates. The PB educational system has expanded rapidly in the last few decades, and much of this growth comes from the increasing representation of women in higher education. Women are substantially less likely than men to earn degrees from high-quality PB programs. That is, there is a gender-quality gap in PB education. At all award levels except among professional degrees, the fraction female is always substantially greater among low-ranked programs than among top-ranked programs 1 .
In the year 1994, 50% of master's degrees granted by top-quality programs were to women, while bottom-ranked programs gave 63% of their degrees to women. A fifteen percentage-point gender-quality gap existed among doctoral programs that same year.
Even as women increase their representation across the board in terms of award level and program quality, the gender-quality gap has been either persistent, as in bachelor's and doctoral degrees, or has grown, as among master's degrees.
Some questions naturally arise. Why does the PB gender-quality gap exist? Can the gap be remedied (and ought it be remedied)? If we attempt to manipulate the gender composition of PB degree earners (for example, by changing admissions policy practices), what is the cost in terms of quality or other program characteristics? These are all important questions, and very little research has studied the relationship between PB program quality and student characteristics in general, or between quality and student gender in particular. The existing studies of PB program quality typically either use an indirect measure of program quality across a broad range of programs or a direct measure of quality defined over a narrow field. 2 More general studies of 1 The term "professional degree" is used here according to IPEDS convention, meaning the so-called first professional degrees of the MD and JD. This differs somewhat from the definition I use in the remainder of the paper.
2 Zhang (2005) uses Carnegie codes to measure quality, while Borjas (2007) uses institutional expenditure. Among the narrower studies, Baker (1998) studies PhD students in STEM fields, Montgomery Mullen et al. 2003; Millet 2003; Weiler 1994 ). This dearth of research is particularly pronounced among master's degree programs, which are far and away the most popular and fastest-growing type of PB programs (see Snyder et al. (2010) , Table 196 ). While master's degree programs have recently drawn more interest from researchers, particularly with respect to the returns to a master's degree ( I investigate the tradeoff faced by admissions committees between applicant ability and gender, as it relates to program quality. Somewhat strangely, while application, enrollment, and persistence decisions at the PB level have been studied fairly frequently, the admissions process is largely ignored. Admissions policy is the main institutional mechanism to screen people into and out of PB education. Stevenson (2012) shows that admissions outcomes are significantly related to gender, but that this relationship is largely explained by gender differences in negative sorting into applicant pools. The idea that there may be a tradeoff between "purely academic" admissions and the desire to manipulate the composition of some other student characteristic has been explored at the undergraduate level with respect to socioeconomic status ( 3 Two sources with extensive discussions of these issues are Bowen and Boa (1998) and Holer and Newark (2000).
PB educational investment typically do not consider program quality (Bedard and
The paper proceeds as follows. After describing the data, in section 3, I sketch a model of the tradeoff between the quality of education they produce and a student body that has a particular gender mix. This theoretical model serves two purposes.
First, it helps me construct an appropriate econometric framework. I do this in the remainder of section 3, and implement the procedure in section 5, estimating the institutional quality production function as revealed through admissions choices. Second, the model suggests that to understand the source of any gender differences in admissions policy, we must understand the nature of the applicant pool. In section 4, I describe the relationship between gender and applicant ability, as it relates to fieldof-study and program quality. The measurement of ability is critical in all of the empirical applications. While I use admissions test scores as a measure of ability, I also construct a broader index of "ability" as the combination of characteristics most valued by high-quality programs in the applicant's field.
The model shows that if the goals of quality production and gender-balancing do not coincide, programs face can face a tradeoff between the two if the marginal applicants of each gender are different. In fact, I show that there are substantial differences in the men and women who apply to programs in the natural sciences, but few differences elsewhere, particularly once I use my broader measure of ability. Gender test score gaps exist in the applicant pool of most fields, across the distribution of program quality, but these gaps largely disappear using the broader metric of ability. Fewer women apply to top programs in highly-male fields, and the women who do apply are have significantly lower ability than the men.
My main program-level estimates show that there is a substantial tradeoff between the student body gender mix and the production of educational quality in the natural sciences. I also find a slightly weaker cost to investment in gender mix in the social sciences. On the other hand, among professional degrees I find no evidence that PB programs face a tradeoff between their desired gender mix and the ability level of their students or the quality of their program. These estimates also provide evidence on the productive value of various financial expenditures at the PB level. Student ability and faculty quality (as measured by average salaries) are complementary in the production of educational quality, as are ability and scholarship spending.
The gender-quality gap in PB education is large. Since most steps in the educational continuation process are largely student-side decisions (application, enrollment, etc.), it's important to study where institutional interventions can be made, and what the costs of these interventions might be. One of the main places where policy intervention could be implemented to counter the gender quality gap is in admissions. I show that the institutional costs associated with reducing the gender gap via admissions policy are likely to be substantial in the natural sciences and social sciences. On the other hand, among professional degrees, there is no substantial tradeoff between gender and quality. Given current patterns of sorting into applicant pools, institutions do not face an acute tradeoff between gender mix and their academic rank in fields like law and medicine.
Data
I use three types of data in this study: institution-level data, program-level data, and student-level data. Institution-level financial data comes from the 1994 Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), since this is the year that most of the paper's applications are observed. PB program quality data comes from two sources.
The first is the National Research Council's 1995 Study of Research Doctorate Programs (SRDP) data (Goldberger et al. 1995) , which I use to measure the quality of master's and doctoral programs in arts and sciences. The SRDP ranks PhD programs using a 5-point reputational scale. I impute this ranking to master's degree programs in that field at that institution, if any. For non-arts-and-sciences PB programs, I use the U.S. News and World Report's "America's Best Graduate Schools" survey (US-NWR 2005). The USNWR quality ranking focuses on professional and service-based fields such as law, medicine, business, education, social work, public administration, and nursing. The scale they use varies by degree program, generally using average student test scores for larger fields like law, medicine, business and education while using the reputational scale (which is effectively identical to the SRDP's) in most other fields. Where available, I use the more objective test score measure of quality, and reputational scores for all other fields. I convert all rankings into centiles within the field.
In order to preserve as much field-level heterogeneity as possible while allowing for reasonable statistical analysis, I group courses of study into what I call "degree programs" d, a combination of broad fields of study and award level. The traditional academic divisions of the humanities, social science, and natural science serve as a baseline for classification. Between master's degrees and doctoral degrees, there are six degree programs in these academic divisions. I also define six types of vocational programs. Three are large "professional" degrees: law (JD), medicine (MD), and business (MBA). Three other vocational programs are master's degrees that are typically terminal: master's degrees in education, engineering, and health (a category in which I place programs in both nursing and community health).
Whenever possible, I assign students to the observed quality rank of their actual major. If this is not possible, I assign the student the average quality of ranked PB majors in their degree program within their institution. In a small number of vocational majors, the USNWR ranking data is truncated at the bottom to simply indicate low rank. For these students, I estimate program quality based on student demographics, undergraduate background and PB institution characteristics among students in the bottom half of PB quality, and then impute the prediction to the students with truncated data.
Student-level data in this paper comes entirely from the Baccalaureate and Beyond (B&B). The B&B is a representative sample of students who earned a bachelor's degree in the U.S. in 1993. It identifies every college and field a student enrolls in at the PB level, and up to two of the PB schools a student applied to in both 1993 and 1994 (their two most-preferred schools, if they applied to more). I identify the degree program a student applied to by either using the degree program they subsequently enrolled in, or by using a combination of their undergraduate major and their planned highest degree of completion. The B&B also collects student SAT and/or ACT score from their college transcript, and asks for a self-report if this information is unavailable. I convert scores into population z-scores, measured in standard deviation units centered around a mean of zero. If both are available, I use the average of the two as the student's test score.
The B&B sample is not representative of the cohort of applicants in 1993 and 1994 for at least two reasons. First, it includes only students who apply to PB school no more than one year after completion of undergraduate education. These students are more "academically attached," with higher test scores and GPA than among the pool of students who ever apply (Nevill and Chen 2007) . Second, it only includes foreign applicants who completed their bachelor's degree in the US. As such, it missed most foreign applicants, who primarily apply to PhD programs. While this is an important limitation to my analysis, it is only a major concern if gender differences in the admissions policy applied to foreign applicants differs greatly from the gender differences in admissions policy among domestic students.
A Model of Quality Production and Admissions
There is a long literature estimating educational production functions, typically performed at either the institutional level, or only among undergraduate programs. Two studies typical of this literature are Cohn, Rhine, and Santos (1989) and Koshal and Koshal (1999) . Ehrenberg (2004) gives a broad summary of this vein of research.
In this section, I construct an econometric model of program-level quality production at the PB level. This model is guided by a simple theoretical model of admissions, constructed in the next subsection. The econometric model is designed to study the tradeoff between gender mix and student ability, but controls for a number of institutional and student-side characteristics. The theory also focuses our attention on the interplay between student selection into the applicant pool and the behavior of admissions committees. It is important to understand these selection forces both in the measurement of ability, and in understanding the extent of the potential program-level tradeoff between gender mix and quality.
To begin, consider the basic admissions problem for a program whose goal is to produce the highest-quality education it can, given it's constraints. Suppose that quality is produced according to the function Q = Q(A, W ), where A represents the mean ability level of enrolled students, and W is a vector of financial expenditures.
Throughout the theoretical discussion, I maintain the assumption that W is endowed according to a program type τ ∈ {1, 2, . . . T }. Higher-τ programs have greater levels of each element in W τ . 4 These expenditure endowments W τ are the first theoretical constraint facing the admissions committee. This endowment creates the "hierarchy" of programs (Winston 1999) , and students self-sort into the applicant pools of various programs accordingly.
A second constraint is that a program must choose students from its applicant pool.
If quality is increasing in ability (net of all its interaction with W ), then the optimal admissions policy is obvious: admit all the highest-ability students until all spaces in the program are filled. This maximizes A and therefore Q.
Non-Academic Preferences
Consider now a situation where programs are not strict quality maximizers. Instead, there is aother objective they wish to simultaneously pursue. Generally, the program attaches value to both Q and some other non-academic variable B. All institutions offering degree program d make admissions offers simultaneously, and I assume that in expectation students earn a net gain to discounted lifetime earn-ings from (marginal) quality improvements. 5 If two programs offer admission to the same student, that student always accepts the offer from the higher-quality program, so each program acts as if it takes the actions of higher-type programs as given.
The ability a of students applying to this degree program is distributed according to the function G s (a), which potentially differs by gender s ∈ [M, F ]. Each program admits students until its capacity is met. Since Q increases with A, regardless of the gender balance chosen, students of each gender will always be admitted in a single compact subset from the top of the ability distribution of applicants who have not been admitted by higher-ranked programs. For program τ , denote by a 
The FOC of this problem, assuming an interior solution, is:
The equilibrium choices can be described by the vector (
. These (A dτ , B dτ ) bundles will be the observable outcomes of the admissions process, and the main variables of interest in the empirical application.
In the case where the program attaches no value to balance, > 0, then relative admissions standards for women will be lowered relative to the standards applied to men (or raised, if ∂U ∂B < 0). In either case, the average ability of admitted students is necessarily lower than under a gender-blind academic standard. The stronger the balance preference, the more A the program is willing to forego.
Quality Production and Gender Preferences
The previous subsection illustrates that non-academic preferences operate as a constraint on the quality production choice. Investing in B is costly in the sense that the program must sacrifice A. I use that insight in the remainder of section 3 to build an empirical model of quality production via the admissions process.
Ability may affect productivity by making financial expenditures more or less productive. For example, higher-ability students may be less costly to teach, lower-ability students may require a more expansive set of student services, and so on. Let the quality production function be represented by the equation
If the program has no non-academic objectives, then the chosen A will be its maximum,
A (given W and its applicant pool). If gender mix is valued and the top applicants do not have gender mix B * , then mean ability among admitted students will fall. Suppose there is a linear relationship between investment in B and the deviation from maximum ability given byĀ
so that if balance is valued, β > 0 and investing in B (either above or below the balance created by gender-blind admissionsB) will result in a decrease in A. Then the mean ability of admitted students can be stated as the ability of top applicants, less a deviation due to gender balancing: A =Ā − β|B −B|. Replacing the first term of equation (3) with this expression implies that
or simply
so that all the α parameters have strict quality-production interpretations, while γ is interpreted as the reduced-form interaction of the productivity of ability and the cost of investment in balance, as measured in ability units.
Measurement of Ability
Equation (6) I address both of these concerns by modeling ability as an index of the applicant's "appealingness" to high-ranked admissions committees. The theory of admissions outlined above implicitly defines ability as the scalar characteristic that makes a applicants more productive in terms of quality. The higher the student ranks in this characteristic, the more likely they are to be admitted by to a high-ranked program. I estimate ability as follows. Let y A i be a categorical variable taking the value of zero if the applicant did not receive an admissions offer, and a value of 1, . . . T if the student is admitted into a program of quality rank q ∈ {1, . . . T }. A student's likelihood of admission is a function of a set of variables that measure academic success S i , other potentially admissions-relevant characteristics C i , and an idiosyncratic shock ν i (assumed to be drawn from a normal distribution with cdf Φ). Given a set of admissions thresholds κ (to be estimated), a student is rejected and y A i = 0 as long as δ
If a student is admitted to a program of quality y
(where κ T is arbitrarily large). This is the standard ordered probit framework. I allow the parameters associated with the S i variables (including the intercept) to vary freely by degree program. This allows both for the fact that quality rankings are only sensible within degree program, and that admissions practices may vary across fields. Fields may differ both in terms of the overall level of selectivity and in the value attached to academic variables like test scores and undergraduate grade point average.
The likelihood of drawing an admissions offer is a function of both these observables and the applicant pool into which the student has selected. This selection may take a number of forms. We expect that high-test-score students tend to be more appealing to admissions committees, but they are also more likely to enter the applicant pools of highly selective programs. If this selection is strong enough, naive estimates will predict negative effects of test scores on admissions likelihood.
In order to correct for endogenous sorting of students across applicant pools, I apply a two-step estimation procedure when I estimate student ability. I apply the method of Dubin and McFadden (1984) . The motivation of the method is similar to the basic Heckman (1979) approach, but with a multinomial choice as a cause of the bias. The first step estimates the selection equation across the dq applicant pools, plus the outside option of not applying to PB education. Given the set of selection parameters recovered from step 1, in step 2 we estimate the equation of interest, the ability equation. Bourguignon et al. (2007) show that the Dubin-McFadden two step method of controlling for bias is robust to a number of misspecifications. It in particular performs well when the step-2 equation has normally distributed errors, as in the ordered probit method applied below. Dubin and McFadden (1984) show that when the step-1 selection equation takes the form of a multinomial logit across options j, the selection terms take the form
ln(P j ) for the predicted optimal choice, and λ j =
for all other options, where P j is the estimated probability that an individual chooses j. Appendix A describes the selection equation, the details of how I estimate λ parameters, and the assumptions imposed on the error terms in a selection correction of this form.
Controlling for the vector of selection terms for each applicant, λ i , I estimate the
Given the estimated parameters of equation (7) (denoted by hats), the latent index
gives a ranking of applicants according to the selection-corrected estimated value of their observable characteristics. Since a i only gives a within-d ranking, I convert the index into a standardized score, with mean zero and standard deviation of one within each degree program. 6 Where µ d and σ d are the mean and standard deviation
. Since I identify the effects of gender on admissions behavior using equation (6), the δ parameters are estimated without conditioning on applicant gender. We can interpret a i as the "gender blind relative appealingness" of a candidate -the contribution of observable characteristics to the likelihood that a candidate is admitted by a top program, unconditional on gender.
Measurement of expenditure
The model above is presented as if W is exogenously endowed at the program level.
IPEDS financial data is reported at the institutional level I. Let Z I be a vector of institutional characteristics. For each program p, I assume
Using the institution-level W I variables of IPEDS may bias the program-level estimates in an undetermined direction, since the measurement error is non-classical. For example, a high-quality program at an institution where all other programs are lowranked is likely to have greater expenditures than the aggregate W I suggests, which would tend to bias our estimate of the effect of spending on quality upwards. In addition, per-student spending is higher in scientific fields, for example, than in the humanities.
I proxy expenditures W according to equation (8) , where W dq is a full set of dq indicator variables and Z I includes all of the elements of X p and the characteristics of all other programs offered at institution I. 7 I predictŴ I for each program and use it as a proxy for W p in the quality production function described below. This procedure, using only variation exogenous to the program's admissions choices, corrects for any endogeneity of W p with respect to Q p , and allows empirically for internal crosssubsidies.
Estimation Procedure
The parameter β of equation (4) represents the tradeoff between changes in student ability and changes in the proportion of women. Programs may be willing to incur this cost because they have a direct gender preference, where women are valued more or less than men in the admissions process (or vice-versa). Or, it could be that among marginal applicants, women and men are different in terms of some other characteristic that we have not controlled for, but that the program finds valuable.
Given a measure of ability and student sorting into applicant pools, defined by quality category q and degree program d, we can estimate the dq-level ability among top applicantsĀ dq , and the gender balance among the top applicantsB dq . Individual programs p are associated with their level of financial expenditures W p and other institutional characteristics X p . A program chooses its gender mix and mean ability (A dq , B dq ) via the admissions process in order to produce the desired level of Q p .
In addition to the structure detailed above, in some specifications I allow the parameters associated with the value of gender balance to vary across four categories of gender intensity, denoted by . As I show below, the relationship between gender, applicant ability, and program quality varies substantially across these groups. Different disciplines may have differing attitudes about the relevance of student gender and the sorts of policies it is reasonable to apply, given their constraints. On the assumption that the Q function is also subject to a normally distributed error process dq p (which allows for idiosyncratic shocks at the dq level), the latent measure of quality is determined by the equation
3) quality dummies for the institution's undergraduate program, if any, 4) the proportion of the institution's student body that is undergraduate, and 5) the total number of PB programs offered by the institution.
This framework allows us to estimate the quality production function with an ordered probit regression across programs observed in the B&B. 8 As the latent value Q p rises across the estimated thresholds κ, we predict the program to be in higher program quality categories. The econometric objective is to maximize the likelihood that, given observed program characteristics, we correctly predict its quality level.
This discrete-choice structure has a few benefits. First, it maps directly onto the multi-type model of admissions described in section 3. The full estimation procedure goes as follows. Given the sample, I estimate the applicant pool selection equation, a multinomial logit over the dq + 1 applicant pool options. From this I calculate the selection terms λ i , and estimate the δ parameters of ability equation (7). I then predict a i and recover A dq , B dq ,Ā dq andB dq . The variables A dq and B dq are simple dq-level means among students offered admissions.
The variablesĀ dq andB dq are calculated by taking the number of admissions offers observed in each dq cell, n a dq , and calculating the gender mix and average ability among the n a dq highest-ability students in that cell. 9 With these variables I can estimate the quality production function, equation (9) . Since a number of these steps involve generated regressors, I must bootstrap over the entire process to generate the standard errors of this equation.
A major concern is that there may be heterogeneity in the value associated with gender balance (and its tradeoff with ability) according to field-of-study or quality. I partly address this issue by allowing the β parameter to vary along with the gender intensity of the program, and partly by allowing for a correlated error process within the dq level. 10 Even so, some heterogeneity in preferences is likely to remain, particularly in the more "academic" degree programs where many majors are grouped together. There is no clear a priori direction to any potential bias caused by this issue. Depending on the gender and ability composition and the true value of β in these fields, balance in aggregate could appear more or less valuable than in the individual fields. On the other hand, in the vocational degree programs such as law, engineering, or education, this heterogeneity in preferences will be much smaller. The individual programs in these categories offer a relatively narrow range of training, and are not aggregations of a broad range of disciplines, as are the social science or humanities. As one sensitivity check to the main specification, I will estimate equation (9) using only the vocational programs.
In this way, the influence of inter-field preference heterogeneity on my estimates should be minimized.
This section's discussion guides the rest of the paper. In section 5, I present the main results, the estimates of equation (9) . But to interpret these results, some preliminary analysis is useful. In the next section, I describe the composition of the PB applicant pool (and of those admitted) according to field, program quality, gender, and ability.
My measure of ability takes two forms, either simple admissions test scores, or the multivariate index of "appealingness" constructed in subsection 3.3, and I describe my estimates of this variable in the following section.
Student Sorting: Applications and Admissions
I begin the investigation of the tradeoff between gender mix and student ability in PB admissions by describing some basic admissions outcomes. I describe how gender, test 10 It may, for example, it be easy for programs in some disciplines that have an established reputation for being high-quality to "shirk" on the ability dimension in order to increase B, but not vice-versa, since lower types are always constrained along the ability dimension by the choices of higher types. In which case, some cells would have higher B or lower A than expected, because of unobservable heterogeneity at the dq level.
scores and "ability" relate to student sorting across fields, and across quality within field. As part of this process, I estimate student ability as a function of characteristics observable to the admissions committee. I show that the distribution of ability across quality among those who apply to programs in the natural sciences is very different between men and women. The men who apply to top natural science programs have significantly higher ability. In most other programs, while the distribution of test scores consistently differs between men and women, once I control for other characteristics, applicants of neither gender are significantly more appealing than applicants of the other gender.
The first two columns of Table 1 describe the fraction female and average test score among students who applied to PB education by 1994 and who subsequently enrolled in a program of the indicated type. I have grouped the degree programs into four categories according to the representation of women. These gender representation categories map closely onto broad academic fiend, with two special cases discussed below. The "highly male" group includes all the degree programs in the natural sciences. The "professional" group includes the JD, MD, and MBA. The "balanced" group includes the master's and PhD in the social sciences, and the "highly female" group includes programs in education, the humanities, and master's degrees in health sciences. The two special cases mentioned above are the master's in natural science and the master's in health science. According to gender representation and test scores, master's programs in natural sciences are similar to programs in the social sciences. This is because there are two relatively disparate groups in this degree program, those in the physical sciences (where there are relatively few women) and those in the biological sciences (where there are relatively many). The academic background and PB coursework of students in the natural sciences is more similar to the other programs in the "highly male" group than to programs in the social sciences. Their admissions committees are also presumably very similar to those in the other "highly male" fields, so I place master's degree programs in natural sciences in the "highly male" group.
Students in master's programs in the health sciences have a PB coursework that is comparable to coursework in the biosciences or medicine. The gender representation and test scores in the health sciences are much more similar to other programs in the "highly female" group. In addition, applicants in the health sciences have a much more heterogenous academic background than applicants to PB programs in the natural sciences.
11 This pattern is much more similar to programs in education and the humanities. For these reasons, I group the master's programs in the health sciences in the "highly female" group.
The most-male degree program is the master's in engineering, the most-female is the master's in education. Among master's programs, engineering students have the highest average test scores, education students the lowest. While the average test score among master's degree students in education is 0.16, the average test score among all bachelor's degree holders is 0.34. By this metric, the typical student of education is negatively selected from the eligible population. Master's students in the health sciences and social sciences have an average ability that is very similar to the typical ability among bachelor's degree holders.
12 Table 1 also describes average test scores by degree program among students enrolled in programs in the top 20% and the bottom 20% of quality, in columns (3) and (5) . In general, test scores among students in high-quality programs are much higher than those in low-quality programs. The strength of this sorting varies substantially across degree programs. In programs where the top students have high test scores, the test score gap between high-ranked and low-ranked programs is large. In law, the gap is 1.66-0.65 = 1.01 standard deviations, and in social science PhD programs, the gap is 0.78 standard deviations. As the program-level average ability in column (2) falls, the test score gap across quality also tends to fall. In my sample, there is no substantial test score gap across quality among the applicants to MD programs or PhD programs in the natural sciences.
13
11 Among applicants to master's degree programs in engineering, 94% have undergraduate backgrounds in either engineering or the natural sciences. Among applicants to PhD or master's degree programs in the natural sciences, 92% and 91% , respectively, have backgrounds in the natural sciences or engineering. On the other hand, students applying to master's in health sciences have backgrounds primarily in the health sciences (37% of applicants), but 24% come from the humanities, 18% from the natural sciences, and 20% from the social sciences and business.
12 Song et al. (2008) discuss the issue of negative selection into master's degree programs, in the context of estimating educational returns to graduate school. 13 By way of comparison to other data sources, there is about a one standard deviation gap in the MCAT scores of enrollees between top and bottom medical programs (AAMC 2012). Student SAT or ACT data is not typically reported by medical schools. Women are significantly less likely to apply to top programs in "highly male" programs than to lower-quality programs, and are more likely to apply to bottom-ranked "highly female" programs than to higher-quality programs. Otherwise, there is no significant difference in gender representation across quality within any of these four groups. Nowhere is there a significant gap in the fraction female between the students who applied and who enrolled.
There are substantial differences in which women and men apply to high-versus low-ranked programs. In Figure 3 , I plot average student ability across a continuous measure of program quality, separately for men and women. As I do for the measure of ability in section 3.3, I state each student's test score as a deviation from the average among applicants in their degree program,
14 Each plot is estimated by local polynomial regression, and pointwise 95% confidence intervals are provided.
Men sort more strongly across quality with respect to test scores than do women.
There is a 0.8 standard deviation test score difference between men applying to top programs and men applying to bottom-ranked programs in the sciences and in professional degree programs. In both of these field groups, there is no significant test score difference across quality among the women. The consequence is that among the applicants to top programs, men have significantly higher test scores than women, while among applicants to bottom-ranked programs male test scores are significantly lower.
Similarly, in highly female programs, there is little test score sorting across quality for women. But among these programs, men also tend not to sort across quality with respect to T , except at the bottom of the quality scale. Outside of the bottom decile, the average man applying to a given program has a significantly higher test score than the average woman. In the relatively gender-balanced area of the social sciences, men and women sort across quality according to test scores in roughly the same pattern.
Two obvious questions arise. First, why is there strong sorting by test scores across quality in some fields, but not in others? Second, why is it that in some fields there are significant gender differences in test scores across quality (as seen in Figure 3) , and yet there is little evidence of large gender differences in enrollment across quality (as in Figure 2 ). 15 One possible answer to both of these questions is that students sort, and admissions offers are made, according to applicant characteristics other than test scores.
As in section 3.3, define ability as a scalar index that takes observable student characteristics and ranks applicants, within a degree program, according to how likely they are to draw an admissions offer from a top-quality school. The estimation of this variable is a two-step process. The first step is the choice of where and whether to apply, and the second step is the estimation of ability, equation (7), an index of the likelihood that an application draws an admissions offer from a top program.
When students make the step-1 choice of the field of study and the quality of program to which they'll apply, they consider the long-run costs and benefits of enrollment.
I estimate this choice as a function of student expectations over the expected income, net tuition (the school's "sticker price", less financial aid), and program length. Expectations are calculated via OLS, as a function of student characteristics. For example, high test score students may expect to earn more in some fields than in others, or may take relatively less time to complete a degree in certain fields. Each expectation is modeled as a function of the student's test score, the program to which they're applying, that program's quality, interactions between test scores and field and quality, and demographic characteristics. Net tuition and program length are estimated from the sample of all students who applied to PB education by 1994 and who ever enrolled.
Expected income is estimated from the sample of students who applied by 1994 and 15 A related concern, also addressed by the discussion to follow: are the observed gender test score gaps simply functions of using a biased measure? In the late 1980s, women's SAT scores were approximately a half a standard deviation below men's (College Board 2011), and many authors argue that the differences occur for reasons other than differences in academic skill (Niederle and Vesterland 2010) . 
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These applicant-level expectations of the costs and benefits are used,under the assumptions of a multinomial logit framework, to estimate the predicted utility of applying to a program of type dq (or choosing the outside option), indexed by j. These utilities give us the expected probability of applying to a program of type j, P j , and therefore the selection correction terms λ j for the ability equation (3.3) (Dubin and McFadden 1984) . This derivation is given in appendix A.
Step 2 takes the λ j estimates as given to estimate the selection-corrected δ parameters of the ability equation. The identifying variation in the ability equation is individual-level differences in observable applicant characteristics. In particular, S i (associated with δ (4) and (6) . Recall that within d, a i is normalized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. More or less by construction, ability is always higher in top programs than in low-ranked programs. The strength of this sorting varies considerably across degree programs. As with test scores, there is a large difference in ability between top and bottom programs among lawyers and PhD social scientists (1.28 and 0.87 standard deviations (σ, respectively). In other fields where there is little sorting across quality by test scores, the sorting by ability is much stronger. The high-low ability gap by quality is 0.64σ in MD programs and 0.36σ in PhD programs in the humanities and education (where the test score gradient appears "backwards" in the B&B). The ability gap is small but positive (0.16σ) in PhD programs in the natural sciences. The MBA and master's in health sciences are interesting cases, where the test score gap between high and low ranked programs is larger than the ability gap. Students in these fields essentially substitute one type of credential for another across the quality distribution.
In programs like law and the doctorate in the social sciences, where the test score gap between high and low ranked programs is comparable to the ability gap, test scores appear to be the central criteria in admissions (or at the very least, test scores are tightly positively correlated with other important characteristics). In programs like the MD and humanities PhDs, other characteristics are more important. This can be seen in part in Table A .1, which reports the coefficients associated with test scores and undergraduate GPA from the ability equation (7) . For students in master's of engineering and science PhD programs, undergraduate GPA is a much stronger predictor of acceptance into high-quality programs than test scores, accounting alone for almost half the variation in ability. GPA is similarly a strong positive predictor of placement in female-intensive programs, with the added consideration that test scores are a weak negative correlate of ability in the humanities and education. This measure of ability is particularly important in the female-intensive programs (but also in medicine and PhD programs in the natural sciences), where test scores alone do not adequately capture the characteristics valued by admissions committees. Figure 4 reproduces the analysis of Figure 3 , except that it plots average ability, rather than test scores, against quality. In most fields GPA is a positive predictor of admissions into top programs, and women tend to have higher undergraduate GPAs.
Among applicants overall, women's GPA is 0.07 points above men's, while women's test scores are 0.37σ below men's. This pattern varies substantially across fields. In the sciences, there is no gender gap in GPA, but the female-male test score gap is -0.22σ. At the other end of the spectrum, in the social sciences there is a statistically insignificant gender test score gap of -0.09σ, but the female-male GPA gap is 0.12 points. Gender differences in both GPA and test scores are large in professional degree programs, and in highly female fields. The female-male test score gap is -0.24σ in professional degree programs, and -0.37σ in the highly female programs. Both program types have a female-male GPA gap of 0.12. As a result, women tend to look like better applicants relative to men when we plot ability across quality, than when we use only test scores.
Measured by test scores, women applying to bottom-ranked natural science programs look significantly worse than the males applying to the same programs. By the metric of ability, these men and women look identical. Measured by test scores, women applying to bottom-ranked social science programs look the same as the men applying to those programs. By the metric of ability, the women are substantially more appealing candidates. There is a substantial gender test score gap, one-half of a standard deviation, in favor of men among applicants in top science programs. This gap widens in favor of men when we rank students by ability. In highly female programs, the gender gap largely disappears across quality as we move from measuring applicant "appealingness" by test scores to the use of ability. Perhaps most interesting, according to test scores, the men applying to professional degree programs are significantly better candidates than the women. The gap closes entirely in the top 70% of programs once we account for non-test factors.
These results show that there are important differences in applicant characteristics across gender, particularly in the natural sciences. While there are large differences in test scores at almost every quality level in almost every field, once we take a broader measure of applicant ability, the gender differences in applicant characteristics disappear in most fields other than the natural sciences. As we now move on to estimate the program-level admissions problem, we expect that the natural sciences are exactly the place where the costs of gender-balancing behavior would be greatest, in terms of the sacrifice of quality and student ability.
Quality Production and Gender Balance
I will now use the section 3 structure to estimate the quality production function of PB programs. From these estimates, we can make inference about the real institutional cost of investing in gender balance. As part of this process, I also provide novel estimates of the value of financial expenditures at the PB level. I also present sensitivity analysis of my results. Over a broad range of specifications, I show that there is a substantial tradeoff between investment in gender mix and program quality in the natural sciences. This is as we'd expect from section 4. More surprising, there is also a tradeoff in degree programs that have a relatively equal mix of men and women. On the other hand, we can not reject the hypothesis that there is no quality cost to investment in gender mix among professional degree programs.
The analysis in this section uses the sample of programs observed in the B&B, and the central variables are A dq and B dq , the average ability and gender mix among admitted students, andĀ dq andB dq , the ability and gender mix among the top applicants. Table 2 provides some summary statistics for the major program-level variables, giving average test scores and ability among the top applicants, by quality level. It also presents the gap between the gender mix among students offered admissions, and the gender mix among the top applicants, as defined by either test scores or ability, |B dq −B dq |. The expenditure variables W are also included in Table 2 . All are stated in units of thousands of 1994 dollars per full time equivalent student (FTES), and vary at the institutional level. Except for average faculty income (which I take to be a proxy for faculty quality), they are the extensive and mutually exclusive (non-hospital) components of university expenditures. Each rises in quality, as expected. Other characteristics included in the estimate of equation (9) through X p but not summarized in Table 2 include indicators for the school's Carnegie code and geographical region, and indicators for the degree program. Table 3 presents the estimates of the parameters of the quality production function.
Quality Production Function Estimates
Recall from equations (5) and (6) that the parameter associated with gender balance γ = −α 1 β, where α 1 is the productivity of student average ability and β is the cost in terms of ability of investment in gender composition B, as given by equation (4) .
Thus γ is the sacrifice in quality of moving away from an ability-maximizing admissions standard and towards some other desired balance B * . The first three columns present results where test scores are used to rank student "appealingness," while the last two columns use ability as measured by equation (7).
Specification (1) is naive, where I suppose that only average test score, gender, and institutional expenditures (interacted also with test scores) are relevant quality-production inputs, and where there is no heterogeneity in gender preferences. Specification (2) allows for financial expenditures to have increasing or diminishing returns.
Specification (3) is identical to (2) except that it allows the cost of gender balance to vary according to the gender intensity of the field. Column (4) replaces test scores as the variable that ranks students with ability. Column (5), which also controls for potential endogeneity in W , is my preferred specification.
There is substantial heterogeneity in the tradeoff between gender balance and ability. If there is a balance-ability tradeoff, then β > 0 and we expect a negative gender coefficient γ, as moving a program's gender mix away from the ability-maximizing standard tends to decrease a program's quality. Yet in specifications (1) and (2), the gender coefficient is significantly positive. When we allow the cost of investment in gender mix to vary with program gender intensity, substantial field-level differences become apparent. While deviation from the gender mix among the highest-test-score applicants (as in column 3) is not significantly related to quality production, deviation from the gender mix among the highest-ability applicants (as in columns (4) and (5)) is significantly related to quality production in the natural sciences. By investing in gender mix, ability falls relative toĀ dq (that is, β > 0). Recall that undergraduate GPA is particularly relevant in sorting students in the natural sciences. This partly explains the large difference in the balance coefficients in the natural sciences between columns (3) and (4). In Figures 3 and 4 , there is a substantial gap in both test scores and ability between men and women who apply to programs in the top half of the ability distribution in the natural sciences. Since men tend to have higher ability in highly-male fields, there is a necessary sacrifice to ability (and therefore program quality) when investing in gender in these programs. While in many specifications reported below I find evidence of a similar but smaller gender-ability tradeoff in the social sciences. I find no evidence in Table 3 or any subsequent sensitivity that there is any cost to investing in gender balance in professional degree programs.
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To get a sense of the magnitude of the tradeoff between gender mix and quality in the natural sciences, consider a program in the second quintile of quality. Table 2 shows that the average gap between the ability-maximizing gender mix and the gender mix actually admitted is 5.1 percentage points. Moving from a gap of 0 to a gap of 5.1, in combination with the column (5) results, implies a fall of 1.15 in the latent quality index. This is exactly half the width between the top threshold and the next, κ 4 and κ 3 . The associated value of β is 12.38, and so according to equation (4), increasing the representation of women by 5% in these programs has the same effect on quality production as reducing A dq by 0.63.
The estimation procedure applied does not allow us to directly distinguish whether there is a tradeoff between quality and gender mix because the men and women applying are different (so that programs manipulate the gender mix in order to obtain some characteristic other than gender), or if applicants are observably similar, and programs simply prefer some gender mix B * =B dq . If equation (9) produces unbiased estimates of quality and male and female applicants are very similar at the margin, then changing a program's gender mix in either direction should have the same impact on its quality. If the men and women applying are different in some salient way that is not modeled, then changing the gender mix relative toB dq , will have different impacts on quality depending on whether men or women are favored. That is, the effect will differ depending on if the gender mix rises or falls. Evidence of a symmetric cost to investment in balance suggests pure gender preference, especially when the gender differences in the applicant pool are small. Asymmetric costs suggest that another mechanism is at work -even if there are balance preferences, they may be driven by some omitted factor. In fact, there is no evidence (from unreported regressions, available upon request) of asymmetric costs in any of the four field groupings. Deviation from the ability-maximizing admissions policy has the same cost regardless of if the marginal student is male or female, as the model developed above suggests.
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Once I allow for heterogeneity in the value of gender, the ranking of top applicants (T dq orĀ dq ) is not a significant contributor to quality. It should not be particularly shocking that this coefficient is insignificant, since the role of |B dq −B dq | in equation (4) is to measure the actual level of ability investment, as it differs fromĀ dq . The γ coefficient is significant in some fields, and so α 1 alone is insignificant in these fields. This is not an artifact of the variable's construction: using the ability of actuallyadmitted students (that is, using A dq rather thanĀ dq as the variable associated with α 1 ) also results in an insignificant ability coefficient. That said, in column (5), average student ability interacts significantly with average faculty salary and scholarship and fellowship spending. By construction a i is centered around zero. A dq is positive for all top-ranked degree programs, and is negative for most bottom-ranked degree programs.
Thus, these W coefficients suggest that for top programs (A dq ≈ 0.35), there are positive and increasing returns to faculty income, while for lower-ranked programs the returns are diminishing. The reverse is true for scholarship spending. The quality returns to scholarship spending are diminishing among top programs, but for sufficiently lowranked programs, the returns to scholarship spending increase at the margin. Research expenditure is positively related to quality production (independent of the ability level of the program's student body), as are scholarship spending and operations and plant spending. The more a program spends on administration, all else equal, the lowerranked it tends to be.
Sensitivity Analysis
A number of assumptions were imposed in order to generate the results of section 5.1. In the discussion that follows, I examine the sensitivity of Table 3 results to alternate assumptions. First, in order to get reasonable sample sizes when I measure gender and ability at the dq level, I grouped PB majors into twelve degree programs across five discrete quality categories. The choice of five quality categories is in many ways arbitrary, and the manner in which one groups programs by content or field will always leave room for debate. To explore the impact of these category definitions, I
present the gender-mix and ability parameters from specifications where I use eightand ten-category quality variables, and where I use both a sixteen category degree program definition in combination with the five-or eight-category quality variable.
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Second, I have discussed the problems that may arise due to within-d heterogeneity in balance preferences. On the assumption that within a narrow field, preferences for gender balance are the same across quality, I may get a cleaner identification of β using only the vocational degree programs, which are fairly homogeneous. Last, in the base regression, I allow the W parameters to appear in a non-linear manner, but I restrict A dq to linearity. In another sensitivity test, I allow equation (3) to include a quadratic term in A dq , which implies that regression equation (9) should also contain squared A dq and |B dq −B dq | terms, and as an interaction between the two. This specification allows us to detect nonlinearities in either the productive value of ability, or in the cost of investment in gender balance.
All specifications in Table 4 are identical to column (5) of Table 3 aside from the exception noted. In all specifications there is evidence of a significant cost to investing in gender balance in the social sciences. This coefficient is very stable across specifications. The results from the first column suggest that β=30.2, or that a one percentage point change in gender mix has a quality cost equivalent to a 0.3 standard deviation drop in ability.
The result that manipulating the gender mix is costly in highly-male fields is generally robust to these specification checks. In all Table 4 specifications, there is a significant tradeoff between gender mix and quality in the social sciences. In the specifications with five-and ten-category quality variables, the significant cost to investment in gender mix appears in the natural sciences. Regressions that use eight quality categories, however, differ from the others, in that the cost of changing a highly male program's gender mix appears smaller than in the other specifications. It may be possible to explain this by considering the other specifications. First, in the regression that uses vocational programs only (as a check on within-d heterogeneity across majors), the coefficient is large and strongly negative. This estimate comes from one program, the master's degree in engineering. The last column of Table 4 shows that the cost of gender in terms of quality is highly nonlinear in the sciences. There are a few low-quality programs that appear very gender-imbalanced. This manifests in the large quadratic term in gender balance, and may explain why in some specifications (those with eight categories), there is no apparent tradeoff between gender and ability, as small and statistically influential programs are grouped in different ways.
Similarly, the Table 4 results for highly female programs are inconsistent, but tend towards the conclusion that gender mix is not substantially related to quality. When focusing only on nursing and education in the "vocational only" specification, there is apparently a positive return to moving these programs away from the female-dominated baseline. In the regressions that include the humanities, however, the coefficients are almost always negative and insignificant. These results could imply that there is no substantial ability-gender tradeoff, that there is substantial field-level heterogeneity in preferences, or that the ability equation is somehow misspecified (for example, via omitted variables) for these programs.
Conclusion
I estimate the tradeoff between student ability, program quality, and gender mix. Simple models of admissions policy predict that if programs admit a gender mix different than that present among their highest-ability applicants, that program's quality will fall. This effect will be particularly pronounced when the gender preferences are strong, or when there is a substantial difference in the distribution of ability between male and female applicants.
Using test scores as a measure of ability, men appear to be more appealing applicants in many fields. This difference largely disappears once we control for the presence of other characteristics observable to the admissions committee. I define ability to be an index that measures the likelihood that a person draws an admissions offer into a high-ranked program as a function of test scores, undergraduate GPA, and other student characteristics, controlling for the endogenous sorting into applicant pools. By this measure, men remain more appealing candidates over a broad range of program qualities in the natural sciences. In most other fields, at most quality levels, male and female applicants have similar ability levels.
Given this measure of ability, I estimate the implied tradeoff between the average ability and the gender mix of a program's student body, in terms of the quality production function. I find that there is a substantial tradeoff between the manipulation of a program's gender mix and the quality ranking of that program in two groups of programs: the natural sciences and the social sciences. I strongly reject the hypothesis that there is any such tradeoff in professional degree programs like law, medicine, or business. The evidence is more mixed in highly-female programs, but tends also towards rejecting the hypothesis of a gender-quality tradeoff.
In the natural sciences, I estimate that moving a program's gender mix by one percentage point away from the baseline has the same impact on quality as a reduction in mean student ability of 0.12 standard deviations. Averaged across specifications, the cost is roughly the same in the social sciences.
This study is limited by its sample. In most narrow fields of study, there is not sufficient data in the B&B to make strong claims about admissions practices. By aggregating into degree programs, we can study broader relationships between gender composition, ability, and PB program quality, in order to narrow the focus of future investigations. Administrative data on PB admissions outcomes across a few disparate fields within these degree programs would help to explain whether the finding of a substantial tradeoff in the natural sciences is driven by a few specific fields or is a broader trait in admissions practices. It could also explain whether the apparent lack of a significant tradeoff in highly-female programs is due to heterogeneous admissions practices among those fields. Administrative data would also allow us to observe both domestic and foreign applicants.
A Appendix: Ability and Applicant Pool Selection
The estimation of ability via an admissions equation is a two step process. The first step generates the predicted probability that each bachelor's degree holding student applies to a program of each dq type (or opts out of PB education). The second step estimates the admissions equation, controlling for the influence of selection across applicant pools. The discussion of this section closely follows the Bourguignon et al. For each applicant, we observe either a rejection so that the admissions outcome y A i =0, or an acceptance into a program of quality q so that the admissions outcome is y A i = q. This outcome is a function of characteristics S i , C i (described in the text) and a normally-distributed shock ν i . Given a set of admissions thresholds κ (to be estimated), a student is rejected as long as δ
The likelihood of each outcome is in part a function of the applicant pool into which the student chooses to enter. We expect that students who are likely to apply to high-quality programs are more appealing candidates, but may be less likely to draw an acceptance exactly because they are in the applicant pool of a more selective program. More formally, the student evaluates the expected value received from each of the j options (here defined by the dq categories), y j i = ζ j V i + η j i . The student applies to the program with the greatest value of y j i . This is problematic because ν i is likely to be correlated with the η j i terms as appealing candidates sort into competitive fields, and so the covariates of y a i will be correlated with its error term. Dubin and McFadden (1984) show that if the step-1 selection process is multinomial logit across J options and we assume a linear relationship between the error processes of the form
where ρ j is the correlation coefficient between ν i and η j i , then the contribution of each option to the bias in ν i conditioning on the observed choice c
We can then estimate the unbiased effects of S i and C i on admissions choice in step 2 given the J vector of selection terms λ i via the equation
where v i is a mean-independent error term. Notice that this specification allows for a flexible set of error processes: we estimate the unrestricted correlation matrix directly, according to equations (10) and (11), since (where ρ is the J-vector of ρ j correlation coefficients)
. Bourguignon et al. (2007) show that the Dubin-McFadden assumptions are robust to fairly arbitrary correlations between the step-1 and step-2 choices, and performs particularly well when the step 2 error is distributed normally, as in the probit model. (12) . Standard errors are generated by bootstrap to account for the generated λ i variables. Note : Each column contains the gender mix and ability coefficients of a separate regression. All specifications are identical to column (5) of Table 3 except for the differnce noted at the top of the column. N Note : Thr eported coefficients all come from a single ordered probit regression over the sample of applications. The dependent variable takes the value of 0 if the applicant is rejected and the value of q (the quality quntile of the program) if the applicant is accepted. Only the variables whose coefficients are allowed to vary with degree program d are reported. Other variables included in the regression are: student undergraduate school quality, an interaction with undergraduate quality and undergraduate GPA, indicators for undergraduate honors, athletic scholarships, and National Merit scholarships, age and its square, indicators for race, and indicators for degree program. Selection coefficients, constructed as described in the appendix, are also included. Standard errors are estimated by bootstrap.
